Seminario “In-Group Defense, Out-Group Aggression, and Coordination Failures in Intergroup Conflict"
Il Dipartimento di Psicologia dei Processi di Sviluppo e Socializzazione organizza il seminario “In-Group Defense, Out-Group Aggression, and Coordination Failures in Intergroup Conflict” del professore Carsten K.W. De Dreu, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Leiden University e al Center for Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam (AMS).
Intergroup conflict persist when and because individuals make costly contributions to their group’s fighting capacity, but how groups organize contributions into effective collective action remains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contributions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression) from those aimed at defending the in-group against possible out-group aggression (in-group defense). I first discuss experiments that unravel key neurobiological substrates underlying (greedy) aggression and (fear-driven) defense, results of which suggest hypotheses about out-group aggression and in-group defense in intergroup conflict. I then discuss two experiments in which three-person aggressor groups confronted three-person defender groups in a multi-round contest game (N=276; 92 aggressor-defender contests). As predicted, in-group defense appeared stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression, and defender groups survived roughly 70% of the attacks. This low success-rate for aggressor groups mirrored that of group-hunting predators such as wolves and chimpanzees (N=1,382 cases), hostile takeovers in industry (N=1,637 cases) and interstate conflicts (N=2,586). Furthermore, whereas peer punishment increased out-group aggression more than in-group defense without affecting success-rates, sequential (versus simultaneous) decision-making increased coordination of collective action for out-group aggression, doubling the aggressor’s success-rate. The relatively high success rate of in-group defense suggests that evolutionary and cultural pressures may have favored capacities for cooperation and coordination when the group goal is to defend, rather than to expand, dominate, and exploit.
Carsten K.W. De Dreu, professor at Leiden University e al Center for Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam (AMS).
Mercoledì 9 Novembre, ore 15:00
Aula XIV, piano 3
Facoltà di Medicina e Psicologia
Via dei Marsi 78, Roma